matchingMarkets: Analysis of Stable Matchings

Implements structural estimators to correct for the sample selection bias from observed outcomes in matching markets. This includes one-sided matching of agents into groups as well as two-sided matching of students to schools. The package also contains R code for three matching algorithms: the deferred-acceptance (or Gale-Shapley) algorithm for stable marriage and college admissions problems, the top-trading-cycles algorithm for house allocation and a partitioning linear programme for the roommates problem.

Version: 0.2-1
Depends: R (≥ 3.0.2)
Imports: Rcpp (≥ 0.11.2), lpSolve (≥ 5.6.6), partitions, stats
LinkingTo: Rcpp, RcppArmadillo, RcppProgress (≥ 0.2)
Suggests: knitr, testthat
Published: 2016-01-30
Author: Thilo Klein
Maintainer: Thilo Klein <thilo at>
License: GPL-2 | GPL-3 | file LICENSE [expanded from: GPL (≥ 2) | file LICENSE]
NeedsCompilation: yes
Materials: README NEWS
In views: Bayesian, Econometrics, Finance, Optimization
CRAN checks: matchingMarkets results


Reference manual: matchingMarkets.pdf
Vignettes: Analysis of Stable Matchings
Package source: matchingMarkets_0.2-1.tar.gz
Windows binaries: r-devel:, r-release:, r-oldrel:
OS X Snow Leopard binaries: r-release: matchingMarkets_0.2-1.tgz, r-oldrel: matchingMarkets_0.1-4.tgz
OS X Mavericks binaries: r-release: matchingMarkets_0.2-1.tgz
Old sources: matchingMarkets archive